First published in 1992, The Efficiency of New Issue Markets provides a theoretical discussion of the adverse selection model of the new issue market. It addresses the hypothesis that the method of distribution of new issues has an important bearing on the efficiency of these markets. In doing this, the book tests the efficiency of the Offer for Sale new issue market, which demonstrates the validity of the adverse selection model and contradicts the monopsony power hypothesis. This examines the relative efficiency of the new issue markets and in turn demonstrates the importance of distribution in determining relative efficiency. The book provides a comprehensive overview of under-pricing and through this assesses the efficiency of new issue markets.
Betal enkelt med kort, Klarna, Apple Pay eller Google Pay. Ikke fornøyd? Du har alltid 14 dagers angrerett. Les mer i våre vilkår. Har du spørsmål, send oss en e-post på hello@memmo.org.
Memmo gjør det enklere å studere – uansett hvor du er i verden. Hos oss samler du pensumbøker og smarte studieverktøy på ett og samme sted: sammendrag, quizer, podkaster og flashcards. Og så Ted, din studiekompis som svarer på alt du lurer på. Over 50 000 studenter studerer allerede her – bygget for at du skal lære raskere og stresse mindre.