Epistemic Dilemmas and Epistemic NormativityEdition 1

This book contains twelve original contributions from leading epistemologists, which connect the debate over epistemic dilemmas with fundamental issues in contemporary epistemology.

In an epistemic dilemma, any doxastic response of an agent will violate an epistemic requirement. Recently, there has been a surge of interest in epistemic dilemmas. However, few attempts have been made to systematically connect epistemic dilemmas to a wider range of issues in epistemology and normative theorizing. The present volume begins to fill this lacuna. Some of its contributions explore new responses to epistemic dilemmas and others present novel epistemic dilemmas, which connect in interesting ways to other areas of epistemology. Several contributions discuss links between epistemic dilemmas and the nature of epistemic and practical reasons, investigate the nature of evidence or of doxastic attitudes, or explore dilemmas arising in collective or oppressive contexts.

Epistemic Dilemmas and Epistemic Normativity will be of interest to scholars and graduate students working in epistemology, ethics, and social philosophy.