Morality CollapsesEdition 1

This book argues that consequentialism and non-consequentialism are false because they face metaphysical and intuitional problems. The two theories exhaust the theories of the right, so there is no rightness.

This result matters because it requires us to give up widely held beliefs regarding knowledge, moral responsibility, and reasons for action. The author’s argument is unique because it focuses on applied-ethical arguments rather than metaethical issues. Specifically, it avoids metaethical discussions of whether morality explains our thoughts and actions, how we know about morality, and whether the denial of morality is self-defeating. The author specifically argues against consequentialism and non-consequentialism in the following ways:

1. Metaphysical Problems: Consequentialism and non-consequentialism are false because they need a theory of counterfactuals and backtracking that they cannot have
2. Rights Problems: Non-consequentialism is false because non-consequentialism depends on rights, and people do not have rights. They do not have rights because of problems regarding moral responsibility, right-grounding, and self-ownership
3. Circularity: Non-consequentialism is false because the basic building blocks of non-consequentialism—desert, rights, and virtue—are circular

Morality Collapses will be of interest to researchers and graduate students working in normative ethics, metaethics, moral responsibility, and political philosophy.