From Human Reasoning to BeliefUtgave 1

This book examines the relation between taxonomy and cognitive architecture in human reasoning. It offers a novel argument for voluntarism of belief that is grounded in empirical research.

The issue of cognitive architecture has pressing ramifications for philosophical discussions about the nature and ethics of belief. This book makes important contributions to taxonomic questions in cognitive science, the cognitive architecture of reasoning, and the nature of belief. On the side of taxonomy, it addresses the important question of whether Type 1/Type 2 processing are cognitive kinds and develops a novel approach to belief by treating it as a putative cognitive kind. On the architectural side, it offers an empirically motivated alternative to Dual-Process Theory and Spinozan Theory. According to the author’s account, the reasoning system operates like a soundboard in that the various property-pairs are like slides on a mixing board, and the process can be rerun multiple times. Because the reasoning system’s final, settled outputs are beliefs, and a subject can rerun the reasoning process—adjusting the slides as they go—subjects exercise some control over what they believe. The author applies the nature of belief to the nature of religious commitment and explores future implications for the ethics of belief.

From Human Reasoning to Belief will appeal to scholars and graduate students working in philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of cognitive science, and epistemology.