This volume presents new research on the epistemology of seemings. It features original essays by leading epistemologists on the nature and epistemic import of seemings and intuitions.
Seemings and intuitions are often appealed to in philosophical theorizing. In fact, epistemological theories such as phenomenal conservatism and dogmatism give pride of place to seemings. Such views insist that seemings are of central importance to theories of epistemic justification. However, there are many questions about seemings that have yet to be answered satisfactorily. What kinds of seemings are there? How do seemings justify? Are seemings connected to truth? Do they play a significant role in inquiry? The chapters in this volume offer a range of useful arguments and fresh ideas about seemings, the nature of justification and evidential support, intuitions, inquiry, and the nature of inference.
Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in epistemology and philosophy of mind.
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