The architects of the Camp David process expected their efforts to become a broad and inclusive framework for peace in the Middle East. Dr. Friedlander's book demonstrates how domestic factors affecting policy decisions made in both Cairo and Jerusalem prevented Sadat and Begin from embracing a structure that would yield a more comprehensive arrangement. Sadat, for example, confronted an antipeace movement in Egypt, strengthened by then-Vice President Mubarak's ties to the military-security establishment and his alliance with members of the Arab nation's diplomatic corps. Begin was opposed by Israeli conservatives who saw the Camp David formulas as leading to a peace that would jeopardize Israel's security. Both leaders, Dr. Friedlander concludes, were able ultimately to guide their nations toward approval of the peace initiative primarily because of their mastery of techniques of domestic intra-elite bargaining.
Betal nemt med kort, Klarna, Apple Pay eller Google Pay. Ikke tilfreds? Du har altid 14 dages fortrydelsesret. Læs mere i vores vilkår. Har du spørgsmål, så send os en mail på hello@memmo.org.
Memmo gør det nemmere at studere – uanset hvor du er i verden. Hos os samler du dine kursusbøger og smarte studieværktøjer ét sted: resuméer, quizzer, podcasts og flashcards. Og så er der Ted, din studieven, der svarer på alt, du undrer dig over. Over 50 000 studerende studerer allerede her – bygget til at hjælpe dig med at lære hurtigere og stresse mindre.
Du kan måske også lide
Køb bogen0